Washington International Law Journal
Volume 16

Number 3

6-1-2007

The Applicability of the Consumer Protection Law in Medical
Malpractice Disputes in Taiwan
Ya-Ling Wu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the
Medical Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Ya-Ling Wu, Comment, The Applicability of the Consumer Protection Law in Medical Malpractice Disputes
in Taiwan, 16 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 805 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol16/iss3/10

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright © 2007 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
DISPUTES IN TAIWAN
Ya-Ling Wu†
Abstract: The issue of whether or not no-fault liability under the Consumer
Protection Law (“CPL”) applies in medical malpractice disputes has been a contentious
battle in Taiwan. In Bo-Li Li v. Mackay Memorial Hospital, the Taipei District Court
interpreted medical care as “services” under Article 7 of the CPL. Under this
interpretation, patient services must meet “reasonably expected safety standards,” while
health care providers are subject to no-fault liability. This interpretation was strenuously
opposed by the medical profession and invoked much debate over its validity in the legal
field. After the Bo-Li case, the lower courts expressed different views on this issue. The
Taiwan Supreme Court was also silent for seven years until recent decisions where the
Court refused to apply the CPL to medical malpractice. Despite this, it is still unclear
whether the interpretation will be codified, as the Legislature was reluctant to exclude
medical care from the reach of consumer protection. The Bo-Li case reveals current
policy and practicability concerns in Taiwan. Under the current scheme, it is difficult to
prove the culpability of doctors in medical injury cases. Thus, no-fault liability under the
CPL may serve as an alternative avenue to compensate victims. However, Taiwan does
not have an insurance network and social welfare system that is favorable to this
possibility. Under the current arrangement in Taiwan, instituting no-fault liability would
eventually force health care providers to practice defensive medicine. Weighing all these
factors, this Comment proposes that no-fault medical liability is currently impractical.
Instead, Taiwan should aim to resolve issues under the current scheme to improve the
litigation process, strengthen the duty of informed consent, and increase the use of
malpractice insurance.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Medical malpractice law in Taiwan has a relatively short history
compared to the U.S.1 It was developed in the early 1990s with the
institutionalization of a centralized National Health Insurance Program
(“NHIP”).2 Under Taiwanese law, the legal basis for medical malpractice
lawsuits derives from criminal liability,3 breach of contract, or tortious

†
The author would like to thank Prof. Veronica Taylor, Judge Fu-Lang Lin, Shinrou Lin, Clark Lin
and the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their help in the development of this Comment.
For consistency, the Wade-Giles system is used for romanization throughout this comment.
1
HSIU-I YANG, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN TAIWAN: MYTH AND REALITY 1 (J.S.D. dissertation,
Stanford University, 1997).
2
Id.
3
See Chung hua ming kuo hsing fa [Criminal Code] (Taiwan) arts. 276, 284 [hereinafter Criminal
Code] (a person who negligently causes bodily injury or death to others shall be punished).
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liability.4 The burden of proof for a tort-based claim is on a plaintiff to
prove standard of care, breach of the standard (negligence), causation, and
damages.5 However, the burden of proof in a medical negligence case
presents several problems.6 A patient seldom has the information necessary
to bring a claim.7 The need for expert testimony also poses an obstacle for
patients.8 In Taiwan, plaintiffs do not have the discretion to introduce
medical experts or evidence at trial. Instead, the judge has the sole authority
to determine which experts will be called.9 A court typically employs the
Medical Review Committee (“MRC”) under Department of Health, the
Executive Yuan,10 which reviews medical records and offers expert opinions
on the medical standard of care.11
The MRC is an administrative agency operated by the Bureau of
Medical Affairs (“BMA”) under the Medical Care Act of 1986.12 Prior to
1987, courts and other judicial organizations routinely consulted with the
Medical Dispute Reviewing Committee (“MDRC”) formed by the Taiwan
Physician’s Association.13 Because the MDRC was composed entirely of
physicians,14 the public questioned its neutrality. In response to this concern,
the Executive Yuan Department of Health founded the MRC in 1987 as the
first official medical review board.15 The MRC consists of physicians,
lawyers, scholars, and social personages.16 In addition to providing expert
opinions for the judiciary, the MRC also handles various matters such as
reviewing new medical technologies and discussing reform agendas.17 The
MRC has been known to favor defendants, such as medical institutions and
4

See Ming fa [Civil Code] (Taiwan) art. 184 [hereinafter Civil Code] (a person who intentionally or
negligently violates the right of another is liable to make compensation for the damage resulting
therefrom).
5
YANG, supra note 1, at 41.
6
Id. at 50.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 52.
9
Id. at 52-3.
10
See Department of Health, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan), Hsing cheng yuen wei sheng shu I
shih shen I wei yuen hui tsu chih kui ch'eng [Department of Health, Executive Yuan, Medical Review
Committee Organization Regulation], available at https://wiki.blinkenarea.org/bin/mini?u=2l (last visited
May 5, 2007).
11
YANG, supra note 1, at 55-6.
12
I liao fa, [Medical Care Act] ch. VIII (Taiwan) [hereinafter Medical Care Act].
13
YANG, supra note 1, at 54.
14
Id. at 55-6.
15
Id.
16
See id. art. 100 (providing that “[m]embers of the medical review committee referred to in the
preceding two Articles shall include medical experts, legal experts, scholars, and social personages,
excluding legislators/councilors and representatives of medical juridical persons, of which legal experts and
social personages shall account for at least one-third of the number of members”).
17
See Department of Health, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. (Taiwan), supra note 10.
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physicians.18 In addition to this impediment, the complexity and cost of
litigation deter and even prevent victims of medical malpractice from
seeking legal remedies.
Because it is difficult to prove negligence under the conventional
scheme, plaintiffs often seek other avenues to recover losses from medical
injuries, such as the no-fault compensation scheme under the CPL.19 The
CPL was enacted in 1994. The underlying legislative purpose was to protect
consumers, traditionally the weaker parties, from the abuses of business
operators.20 The CPL forces business operators to comply with the
reasonably expected standard, which is detailed in the Enforcement Rules of
the CPL.21 Subsequent to the passage of the CPL, there was and is still
much disagreement over the definitions of “service,” “consumer,” and
“business operator” in its statutory language.22
For the first time in Taiwan, the Taipei District Court adopted a nofault medical liability rule under the CPL in Bo-Li Li v. Mackay Memorial
Hospital.23 This case signaled a potential change in patients’ right to seek
remedies in medical malpractice disputes. However, this case also triggered
debates over whether medical personnel should be subject to no-fault
liability.
This Comment addresses several subjects arising out of this issue.
Part II provides a summary of the Bo-Li case. Part III examines in depth the
Bo-Li court’s interpretation of the CPL’s scope. Part IV discusses the issues
related to the burden of proof in a medical malpractice case. Part V analyzes
other judiciary holdings, including the recent Taiwan Supreme Court’s
opinion, as well as the Legislature’s position. Finally, this Comment
addresses the practicality of applying no-fault liability to medical injury
lawsuits and suggests future directions in Part VI and VII. This Comment

18

See infra Part IV.
Hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa [Consumer Protection Law] (Taiwan) [hereinafter CPL], available at
http://www.cpc.gov.tw/en/index.asp?pagenumber=638 (last visited Apr. 4, 2007). No-fault liability applies
both to goods and services under the CPL. The essence of no-fault liability is similar to implied warranty
of merchantability and strict liability in the U.S. law.
20
See id., art. 1.
21
Hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa shih hsing his tse [Enforcement Rules of the CPL] art. 5 (Taiwan)
[hereinafter Enforcement Rules]. Enforcement Rules of the CPL supplements the CPL. Article 5 of the
Enforcement Rules provides that “‘[d]anger to safety or sanitation’ as mentioned in Paragraph 1, Article 7
of the Law shall be present if the goods, when circulated into the market, or the services, when provided,
lack the generally and reasonably anticipated safety, except where such goods or services are up to the then
scientific and technical or professional standards.”
22
See infra Part V.
23
Bo-Li Li v. Mackay Mem’l Hosp., 1998 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taipei Dist. Ct., Jan. 2, 1998) (85
Docket No. SU 5125) [hereinafter Bo-Li].
19
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also translates the reasoning of the original court opinion and addresses the
debate over whether medical care is under the scope of the CPL.
II.

CASE SUMMARY OF BO-LI LI V. MACKAY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

The seminal case applying the CPL in the medical context was a birth
injury lawsuit decided in 1998.24 The plaintiff, Bo-Li Li, was born at
Mackay Memorial Hospital on December 5th, 1994. Before Li’s birth, his
mother Tan had regular prenatal check-ups at Mackay Memorial Hospital by
Dr. Cheng-Chieh Cheng. Over the course of Tan’s labor, an emergency
situation called shoulder dystocia occurred. Shoulder dystocia occurs when
the fetal head has been delivered but the shoulders are stuck and cannot be
delivered.25 In response to the medical condition, Dr. Cheng performed a
procedure called the “McRoberts maneuver” to assist with Tan’s labor. Soon
after Li was born, his parents discovered that Li’s right forearm was
paralyzed due to brachial plexus injuries that are generally associated with
shoulder dystocia.26 Even though Li received further surgery and physical
reconstruction, his injured arm was still unable to achieve normal function.
As a result of his injury, his right arm could only move 130 degrees, instead
of the normal range of 180 degrees.27 His medical condition was confirmed
by the MRC and was not disputed by either party.28
Shoulder dystocia is considered an unpredictable emergency.
However, maternal obesity, diabetes, and fetal macrosomia are prenatal
factors associated with the incidence of shoulder dystocia.29 The plaintiff
Bo-Li Li brought a tortious claim against the defendant, the Mackay
Memorial Hospital, for the malpractice of its employee, Dr. Cheng-Chieh
Cheng.30 The plaintiff also contended that the defendant was liable under
Article 7 of the CPL for failing to provide necessary services to ensure Li’s
safety, despite several indications of risk over the course of Tan’s
24

Id.
Robert B. Gherman, et al., Shoulder Dystocia: The Unpreventable Obstetric Emergency with
Empiric Management Guidelines, 195(3) AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 657, 658 (2006).
26
National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Erb-Duchenne and DejerineKlumpke
Palsies
Information
Page,
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/brachial_plexus_birth/brachial_plexus_birth.htm (last visited Feb. 16,
2007) (The brachial plexus is a network of nerves that conducts signals from the spine to the shoulder, arm,
and hand. Brachial plexus injuries are caused by damage to those nerves).
27
See Bo-Li, supra note 23.
28
See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li.
29
Gherman, et al., supra note 25, at 659. The term “fetal macrosomia” is used to describe a
newborn infant with an excessive birth weight.
30
See Bo-Li, supra note 23. Dr. Cheng was sued in a separate case for occupational negligence and
was found not liable both by the Taipei District Court (84 Docket No. Tzu 427) and Taiwan High Court (85
Docket No. SHANG-I 2132).
25
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pregnancy.31 First, Tan was considered an overweight mother.32 She
originally weighed eighty kilograms and had reached 90.8 kilograms by the
last prenatal visit.33 The plaintiff was a macrosomic infant with an excessive
weight at birth.34 Dr. Cheng estimated his weight at week thirty-eight as
equivalent to that of a forty-week fetus, but failed to give any warning.35
The defendant responded that in light of current medical knowledge, the care
provided met the standard of reasonably expected safety and sanitation.
Although the doctor was found not to be at fault, the Taipei District Court
held that the hospital was liable under the CPL.36
The case was appealed to the Taiwan High Court, which affirmed the
district court’s holding.37 However, the Taiwan Supreme Court did not
express its position as to the applicability of the CPL.38 The case was
remanded for further factual findings on whether Dr. Cheng’s procedure
complied with the reasonably expected safety standard. Ultimately, the
parties settled.
Subsequent to this case, courts’ opinions have varied regarding the
applicability of the CPL in medical malpractice cases.39 Although this issue
was first brought to the courts several years ago, it is still unclear whether
medical care is within the scope of the CPL in Taiwan.
III.

THE BO-LI COURT EXTENDED
CARE

THE

SCOPE

OF THE

CPL

TO

MEDICAL

The key question about the scope of the CPL arises from how the
statutory language of the CPL should be construed. Particularly, there has

31
See Bo-Li, supra note 23. The original provision of Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the CPL provides
that “business operators engaging in the provisions of services shall ensure that services provided by them
are without danger to safety or sanitation.” In 2005, the original language was amended to “business
operators engaging in the design, production or manufacture of goods or in the provisions of services shall
ensure that goods and services provided by them meet and comply with the contemporary technical and
professional standards of the reasonably expected safety prior to the sold goods launched into the market,
or at the time of rendering services.” See CPL, supra note 19, at art. 7.
32
See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li.
33
See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li.
34
See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li.
35
See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li.
36
See Bo-Li, supra note 23. Judge Hui-Rou Tsai presided over the Bo-Li case in the Taipei District
Court.
37
See the Taiwan High Court 87 Docket No. SHANG 151. The judicial system in Taiwan
comprises three levels of courts: district courts, high courts and the Supreme Court. The Taiwan High
Court is the intermediate appellate court in the northern part of Taiwan.
38
See The Taiwan Supreme Court 90 Docket No. TAI-SHANG 709.
39
See infra Part V.
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been much debate on whether the Bo-Li court’s interpretation of Article 7 of
the CPL is consistent with the legislative intent and underlying policies.
A.

The Bo-Li Court Adopted a Broad Statutory Interpretation of
“Services” Under the CPL

The Bo-Li court stated that “any business or enterprise that provides
services to consumers, due to its relation with consumers’ safety and
sanitation, is subject to the CPL regardless of whether the services are
related to merchandise.”40 Although medical care is not a trade directly
related to merchandise, it certainly provides services concerning consumers’
safety and sanitation. Therefore under this definition, medical care
providers are “business operators” under the CPL. In order to determine
whether seeking medical care is a form of consumption, the Bo-Li court also
employed economists’ interpretation to define “consumption.” It reasoned
that consumption is “an activity to reach an individual’s life goals.”41 Under
this broad definition, patients are considered consumers because receiving
medical care is an act performed in order to fulfill individual needs.
The legal and medical fields have also expressed different views on
the interpretation of Article 7 of the CPL. A legal study argued that the way
the court interpreted “consumption” was too indefinite.42 It proposed that
this issue should turn on the examination of the activity’s purpose and the
legislative intent of the CPL.43 First, the scope of consumption should be
limited to activities that are for personal, not professional purposes.44 Since
medical care is private, it should be within the scope of “consumption.”
Second, because the legislative intent of the CPL is to ameliorate the
unequal bargaining power between business operators and consumers,
anyone who is subject to risks related to merchandise or services ought to be
within the scope of consumer protection.45 This study also explained why
the CPL is distinct from product liability laws in Western countries.46
Although it came to the same conclusion as the Bo-Li court, the test
employed by this study is narrower than the court’s approach. Still, there

40

See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li.
See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li.
42
Chung-Wu Chen, I liao hsing wei yu hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa fu wu tse jen chih shih yung ling yu
[Medical Care and the Applicability of the CPL to Service Liability], 7 TA’I-WAN PEN T’U FA HSUEH TSA
CHIH [TAIWAN LAW JOURNAL] 36, 47 (Feb. 2000) (Taiwan).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 47-8.
46
Id.
41
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continues to be disagreement in the legal academy as to whether the scope of
the CPL should extend to medical care.47
In the medical profession, the predominant view is that the scope of
the CPL should not extend to medical care. Doctors unanimously oppose
medical personnel being classified as “business operators,” 48 and strongly
disagree with the notion that patients are consumers.49 The medical field has
contended that the relationship between doctors and patients should not be
treated as a business relationship, because seeking medical care is not
consumption.50 Physicians’ main concerns are the implied risks associated
with the medical profession.51 While the danger to consumers is predictably
associated with inherently dangerous goods, the medical risks are generally
unforeseeable and beyond the doctor’s control.52 Therefore, it is unfair to
allocate all the risks to medical care providers.53
Furthermore, unlike Taiwan, most other jurisdictions do not award
damages to medical malpractice cases under no-fault liability. Thus, the
medical field urges that courts should prioritize other applicable laws such as
the Medical Care Act or the Physicians Act54 before the CPL. Since 1995,
Taiwan’s medical care has operated under a national insurance scheme and is
more analogous to a non-profit service than to a business operation.
Accordingly, the CPL, which primarily deals with business corporations,
should not apply to medical care.55
B.

Medical Personnel’s Conduct Is Measured by a “Reasonably
Expected Safety” Standard Under the No-Fault Liability Scheme

A second inquiry in the Bo-Li case was whether the medical care
provided by the defendant complied with the “no danger to safety or
sanitation” standard set forth in Article 7 of the CPL. The Enforcement
Rules define “danger to safety or sanitation” as lacking “the generally and
47

Id. at 40.
Chung-Hsin Hsu, Hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa yu i liao fu wu chih shih yung yu chieh shih
[Interpretation of the CPL and Its Applicability to Service Liability], 7:3 I SHIH FA HSUEH 49, 49 (Sept.
1999) (Taiwan).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Fu-Hsien Wang, Ts’ung i liao hsing wei shih yung hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa chih cheng i shih lun i
liao cheng i wei lai tsou hsiang [Applicability and Interpretation of the CPL], 56:9 FA LING YUEH K'AN
[LAW MONTHLY] 30, 42 (1999) (Taiwan).
53
See Hsu, supra note 48, at 49.
54
I shih fa [Physicians Act] (Taiwan) [hereinafter Physicians Act].
55
Tzu-Yu Li, I liao hsing wei wu kuo shih chih yen chiu — chien lun 2004 nien “I liao fa” ti pa shih
erh t'iao chih hsiu cheng [Study of Medical no-fault liability], 3 CHUNG HUA JEN WEN SHE HUI HSUEH PAO
62, 64 (2005) (Taiwan).
48

812

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 16 NO. 3

reasonably anticipated safety” standard.56 In 2004, the language in Article 7
was changed from “no danger to safety or sanitation” to “reasonably
expected safety standard” and reflected the standard set out in the
Enforcement Rules.57 If a physician’s conduct fails to satisfy the
“reasonably expected safety” standard under the CPL and the Enforcement
Rules, he is liable for the injury caused to the plaintiff regardless of whether
he is at fault.
Applying the rule in this case, the Bo-Li court held that the hospital
was liable because the medical service did not meet the “reasonably
expected safety” standard. The court reached this decision despite the fact
that Dr. Cheng exercised all possible care. One issue arising from this
reasoning is whether the no-fault liability scheme is essentially a fault-based
system adopted by the Bo-Li court only with a higher standard. In other
words, the question is, under the no-fault liability system, whether there is a
difference between negligence and failing to meet the reasonably expected
safety measure.
One study suggested that the reasonably expected safety standard is an
objective determination of “abnormal or unreasonable risks” associated with
medical care, whereas negligence is a subjective measure of the defendant’s
conduct.58 Because abnormal or unreasonable risks are unforeseeable, they
are irrelevant to defendant’s actions.59 Accordingly, no-fault liability should
apply to injuries caused by this type of risk. In contrast, a service provider’s
fault is determined by his conduct, such as whether he breached the duty to
prevent foreseeable risks. Therefore a fault-based scheme should be used
under these circumstances.60
The same study suggested that no-fault liability should apply to
“medical accidents,” not “treatment failure.”61 “Medical accidents” are
unforeseeable injuries outside the scope of medical care.62 These injuries are
neither side effects nor ineffective medical outcomes. Under these
circumstances, it is rational to apply the “reasonably expected safety
standard” under the no-fault scheme to protect patients from unpredictable
56

See Enforcement Rules, supra note 21, at art. 5.
See CPL, supra note 19, at art. 7.
Chung-Wu Chen, I liao shih ku yu hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa fu wu tse jen chih shih yun yao chien
(shang)--t'ai-wan t'ai pei ti fang fa yuen pa shih wu nien tu su tzu ti wu i erh wu hao yu t'ai wan kao teng fa
yuen pa shih ch'I nien tu shang tzu ti I wu i hao (ma chieh chi nien i yuen chien nan ch'an an chien) p'an
chueh tsai p'ing shih [Medical Accidents and the Applicability of the CPL, Part I] 17 T'AI-WAN PEN T'U FA
HSUEH TSA CHIH [TAIWAN LAW JOURNAL] 75, 80-102 (Dec. 2000) (Taiwan).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 102-7.
62
Id.
57
58
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risks.63 On the other hand, “treatment failure” refers to the uncertainty
associated with medical care.64 Because of the variation among patients’
symptoms and physical conditions, perfect results are not guaranteed. It is
impossible to avoid side effects or negative medical outcomes. Accordingly,
no-fault liability should not apply to injuries caused by “treatment failure.”65
This study concluded that the analysis is consistent with the underlying
policy of the CPL to protect patients (consumers) in malpractice cases.66
Nevertheless, in practice it is difficult to differentiate “treatment
failure” from “medical accidents” and whether the risks are foreseeable or
reasonable. Thus, the measurement of physicians’ conduct remains a
problem when determining the applicability of the CPL in medical
malpractice settings.
C.

No-Fault Liability Is Subject to the Exception of the Then Technical
and Professional Standard

The Enforcement Rules provide a technical defense: goods or
services that are up to the current scientific and technical or professional
standards may be exempt from the CPL.67 In essence, it is similar to the
state-of-the-art defense under U.S. product liability. That is, if the defendant
can prove that at the time the product was manufactured, the state-of-the-art
did not allow for production of a safer product at a reasonable cost, the
defendant is not liable for injury caused to the plaintiff.68 The concept of the
technical defense under the Enforcement Rules originates from the European
Union Product Liability Directive.69 Article 7 of the Directive provides that
“[t]he producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he
proves . . . that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time
when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the
existence of the defect to be discovered.”70 Accordingly, the technical
63

Id.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See Enforcement Rules, supra note 21, at art. 5.
68
See 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1319 (1997).
69
Chung-Wu Chen, I liao shih ku yu hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa fu wu tse jen chih shih yun yao chien -t'ai wan t'ai pei ti fang fa yuen pa shih wu nien tu su tzu ti wu i erh wu hao yu t'ai wan kao teng fa yuen pa
shih ch'I nien tu shang tzu ti I wu i hao (ma chieh chi nien i yuen chien nan ch'an an chien) p'an chueh tsai
p'ing shih-shang [Medical Accidents and The Applicability of Consumer Protection Law to Service
Liability, Part II] 18 T'AI-WAN PEN T'U FA HSUEH TSA CHIH [TAIWAN LAW JOURNAL] 39, 41-2 (Jan. 2001)
(Taiwan).
70
Council Directive 85/374, art. 7, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (EU), available at www.dehpfacts.com/upload/documents/document42.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2007) (emphasis added).
64
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defense under the Enforcement Rules refers to undetectable risks based on
technical or professional standards at the time the service was provided.
However, the definition of “standards” is unclear, as they are variable
depending on location and specialization.
The Bo-Li court employed a strict interpretation of this technical
defense, reasoning that “the determining factor is not whether a particular
manufacturer who complies with the typical objective group standard could
recognize the risks or defects. Instead, it is whether anyone would know the
risks in an objective standard.” In other words, the technical exception
applies only when no one in the world would recognize the medical risks
associated with the most advanced technology available. Under this strict
construction, the Mackay Memorial Hospital could not raise the technical
defense, as Tan’s obesity would have been recognized as a possible cause for
shoulder dystocia. Consequently, it would be irrelevant whether the
shoulder dystocia was unpredictable or unpreventable.71
Compared to Bo-Li, courts in subsequent opinions employed a more
lenient interpretation with respect to technical defenses. Even if the court
held the CPL applicable, defendants have prevailed by raising the technical
defense in the medical dispute setting.72
IV.

THE BO-LI CASE REFLECTS PROBLEMS WITH THE PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN
OF PROOF IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES

The burden to prove negligence in a medical malpractice case is
highly technical and requires professional expertise. Similar to the U.S.
scheme, proof of a medical malpractice claim in Taiwan requires a showing
of the standard of care, breach of the standard by the defendant, injury, and
causation. Unless the burden is shifted to the defendant,73 the plaintiff bears
the burden to demonstrate defendant’s fault in a medical negligence suit.74
Under the American tort scheme, plaintiffs are permitted to introduce
expert testimony of their choice to establish the standard of care. The
expert’s role is to help the fact-finder to understand technical subject matters
outside common knowledge. In contrast, a Taiwanese plaintiff usually does
not have the ability to introduce expert testimony in court. Instead, the court
71

See infra Part IX for the translation of Bo-Li (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Yueh-Chen Yang v. Hung-Hui Kuan CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taichung Dist. Ct. Dec. 25,
2003) (91 Docket No. CHUNG-SU 936).
73
See, e.g., Enforcement Rules, supra note 21, at art. 6 (providing that a defendant has the burden of
proof if raising the technical defense under the CPL).
74
Min shih su sung fa [Code of Civil Procedure] (Taiwan) art. 277 [hereinafter Code of Civil
Procedure].
72
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orders the MRC to investigate medical disputes and offer advisory expert
testimony concerning a defendant’s negligence and causation. Because
courts usually do not have the knowledge and experience to evaluate a
physician’s conduct, they typically adopt the MRC’s conclusions in making
their decisions.75
The review procedure of the MRC in a medical dispute comprises
screening, preliminary peer review, and secondary review.76 At the
screening stage, the clerk of the BMA registers the judicial inquiry of a case
and checks the sufficiency of information.77 If the MRC decides to take on a
case, it will assign the file to a medical institution for preliminary peer
review. The appointed institution then conducts the review and delivers a
written opinion within weeks of the MRC’s request.78 At the stage of
secondary review, the MRC will discuss the preliminary review and render
opinions.79 Physicians on the MRC will provide further medical opinions,
while non-physicians can raise concerns about the laws and plaintiffs’
interests.80 A final report is submitted to the inquiring organization after the
MRC members reach a unanimous decision.81
Although the new structure of the MRC was intended to balance the
interests of medical personnel and patients, several concerns about its
objectivity have been raised. First, the MRC’s review is based solely on the
documents provided by the inquiring organization.82 Patients are not entitled
to participate in the MRC meeting during the review process.83 Second,
patients do not have easy access to medical records, which are often
incomplete or illegible.84 Third, the identities of parties involved in a suit
are not concealed, raising a possibility of bias and favoritism.85 Moreover,
there are accusations of a “conspiracy of silence” within the medical
profession.86 It is rare that a physician will testify against another in a
medical malpractice case. A recent study showed that between August 1,
1999 and September 30, 2005, the MRC found negligence in only 13.4% of
75

YANG, supra note 1, at 59.
Taiwan Health Reform Foundation, Medical Disputes Reference Brochure, available at
http://www.thrf.org.tw/Page_Show.asp?Page_ID=340 (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
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YANG, supra note 1, at 58.
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Id, at 60.
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Id. at 57-8.
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Id, at 52.
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medical malpractice inquiries.87 In addition, the growing number of medical
malpractice lawsuits increased the judicial inquiries of medical review. The
number rose from an average of 198 in 1995 to 465 inquiries in 2003.88 The
increased inquires also cause delay in the medical review and public
skepticism as to its quality.
The Bo-Li case exemplifies the long-standing problem of proving
negligence in a malpractice case. The plaintiff in Bo-Li brought a tortious
claim against the hospital for failing to ensure his safety. However, based on
the medical review supplied by the MRC, the court was unable to reach a
conclusion regarding the defendant’s fault. Under the U.S. expert system,
such a case might have found negligence, as Dr. Cheng did not give any
warning despite a number of risk indications over Tan’s pregnancy. In fact,
the academics have questioned whether Dr. Cheng failed to exercise his duty
of informed consent. 89 As an alternative avenue to compensate the plaintiff,
the Bo-Li court held that medical personnel should be subject to no-fault
liability under the CPL. Accordingly, although the Mackay Memorial
Hospital was found faultless, it was held liable for Bo-Li Li’s plexus injuries
resulting from shoulder dystocia.
V.

THE SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO EXTEND THE SCOPE OF THE CPL TO
MEDICAL CARE, WHILE THE LEGISLATURE’S ATTITUDE IS UNCLEAR

A.

The Lower Courts Hold Different Views on the Scope of the CPL from
That of the Bo-Li Court

Since the Bo-Li case, lower courts have been split on the interpretation
of Article 7. For example, in Rui-Liang He v. Taipei Yang-Ming Hospital,
the Shi-Lin District Court indirectly affirmed that medical care is within the
scope of the CPL, although the case was dismissed because of the statute of
limitation.90 However, in Shu-Han Hsu v. Hung-Chih Hsu, another shoulder
87

TSE-CHENG WU, TS'UNG PING HUAN KUAN TIEN T'AN T'AO YIN CH'I I LIAO CHIU FEN CH'AN SHENG TE
YUEN YIN YU LEI HSING --I T'AI-WAN FA YUEN P'AN CHUEH TZU LIAO WEI CHI CH'U [THE STUDY OF CAUSES
AND TYPES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE FROM PATIENT’S PERSPECTIVE — BASED ON DECISIONS OF COURTS
IN TAIWAN] (Masters’ Thesis, National Taiwan University Jan. 2006) 5 (using five characteristic indexes to
screen all district court decisions on civil lawsuits, excluding non-malpractice and repeated cases and
selecting 162 cases for study).
88
Ching-Te Lai, Tui i liao shang hai ch'u li fa ts'ao an te cheng fan mien i chien [Pros and cons of
Medical Injury Management Proposal], available at http://morpheus.typepad.com/iait/2007/02/post_1.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
89
See discussion infra Part VII.B.
90
See Rui-Liang He v. Taipei Yang-Ming Hosp., 2001 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Shi-Lin Dist. Ct., May 8,
2001) (89 Docket No. SU 1185).
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dystocia and birth injury case, the Taipei District Court reached a different
conclusion.91 In contrast with the Bo-Li case, the Shu-Han court emphasized
that medical care should be exempt from the CPL.92 The court in Shu-Han
reasoned that seeking medical care is not consumption within the meaning of
the CPL, as it is neither merchandise nor for the purpose of profit. As
medical care is closely associated with public health, it should be regulated
by health-related laws such as the Medical Act, not the CPL.93
The court deciding Sheng-Hsiung Huang v. Shu-Hsun Chu rejected
applying the CPL and ultilized the approach of “teleologische reduktion”
(teleological or purposive reduction).94
That is, when the literal
interpretation is not consistent with the legislative intent, the statute must be
construed restrictively to comply with its purpose.95 Courts adopting this
theory believe that no-fault liability would drive doctors to practice
“defensive medicine” and avoid liability rather than benefit patients.96
Under this theory, although medical care is within the literal interpretation of
services under the CPL, imposing no-fault liability is inconsistent with the
legislative purpose to protect the interests of consumers (patients).97
Similarly, other courts considered the public policy of preventing defensive
medicine and refused to extend the scope of the CPL.98
B.

The Taiwan Supreme Court Refuses to Extend the Scope of the CPL to
Medical Care

Despite the existence of different views among the lower courts, the
Taiwan Supreme Court was silent on the scope of the CPL for seven years.
In Chin-Ying Yao Su v. Miao-Li Hospital, Department of Health, a case
involving a birth injury dispute, the Supreme Court spoke on the issue for
the first time, and held that “medical care is not within the scope of the
91
See Shu-Han Hsu v. Hung-Chih Hsu, 2000 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taipei Dist. Ct. Sept. 20, 2000)
(87 Docket No. SU 4511) [hereinafter Shu-Han]. Judge Kun-Tien Liu presided over the Shu-Han case in
the Taipei District Court.
92
See id.
93
See id.
94
See, Sheng-Hsiung Huang v. Shu-Hsun Chu 2002 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taipei Dist. Ct. Feb. 6,
2002) (88 Docket No. SU-TZU, 5027) [hereinafter Sheng-Hsiung]. Judge You-Ching Liu presided over the
Sheng-Hsiung case.
95
Wang, supra note 52, at 45-6 (providing explanation of Teleologische Reduktion).
96
Defensive medicine: Medical practices designed to avert the future possibility of malpractice suits,
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=33262.
97
See CPL, supra note 19, at art. 1, para. 1 (providing that “the Consumer Protection Law . . . is
enacted for the purposes of protecting the interests of consumers, facilitating the safety of the consumer life
of nationals, and improving the quality of the consumer life of nationals”).
98
See e.g., Yu-Ying Chi v. Te-Chao Chen, 2001 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taipei Dist. Ct., Feb. 14, 2001)
(87 Docket No. SU 1521).
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CPL.”99 Although the Court did not give any reasoning for its interpretation,
the Chin-Ying case delineated the Taiwan Supreme Court’s position on the
issue of scope. Last year, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in
Sheng-Chan Chien v. Fang-Ping Chen.100 This case was about a vacuum
extraction that led to permanent brain lesions in a newborn. The plaintiff
sued the hospital under the no-fault liability clause in the CPL. The Taiwan
Supreme Court refused to apply the CPL, reasoning that the legislative intent
of the CPL was to impose no-fault liability to deter manufacturers from
bringing dangerous goods into the market.101 However, current medical
knowledge is in fact quite limited as to treatment options.102 If no-fault
liability is imposed on medical care, doctors may undertake procedures
based on the severity of side effects or give up a more effective but high-risk
procedure to avoid liability.103 This would delay timely treatments, increase
unnecessary waste of medical resources, and would not benefit society or
patients.104 The Court reasoned that defensive medicine obviously runs
counter the legislative intent of the CPL to protect the interests of
consumers, and concluded that the CPL should be construed restrictively
under teleologische reduktion.105 The Taiwan Supreme Court held that
medical care should be excluded from the scope of the CPL.106
In Sheng-Chan, the Supreme Court explained why the CPL should not
apply to medical care at length.107 Like the Sheng-Hsiung court,108 the
Supreme Court refused to extend the scope based on legislative intent and
policy concerns of preventing defensive medicine. Although stare decisis
does not apply to Taiwan’s civil law, the highest court’s opinion can strongly
influence a future interpretation of a law by lower courts.109 In fact, the
Taipei District Court cited the Supreme Court’s holding in a recent medical

99
See Chin-Ying Yao Su v. Miao-Li Hosp., Dept. of Health, 2005 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taiwan S.
Ct., June 23, 2005) (94 Docket No. TAI-SHANG 1156). See also Chin-Tien Chiu, I liao hsing wei ping pu
shih yung yu Hsiao fei che^ pao hu fa chih kui ting [The CPL is Not Applicable to Medical Care] 9:11
CH'UAN KUO LU_ SHIH [TAIWAN BAR JOURNAL] 64, 72 (Nov. 2005).
100
See Sheng-Chan Chien v. Fang-Ping Chen, 2006 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (Taiwan S. Ct., Sept. 28,
2006) (95 Docket No. TAI-SHANG 2178) [hereinafter Sheng-Chan].
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See CPL, supra note 19, at art. 1, para. 1.
106
See Sheng-Chan, supra note 100.
107
Id.
108
See Sheng-Hsiung, supra note 94.
109
However, the Taiwan Supreme Court may designate a particular opinion to be a binding precedent
as “Pan-Li.”
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dispute case.110 However, only the legislature may make the law under the
civil law system, so the ultimate definition of the CPL’s scope is still a
legislative issue.
C.

The Legislature’s Stand on the Scope of the CPL Is Unclear

After Bo-Li was decided, the medical field began campaigning for the
Legislative Yuan to exclude medical care from the scope of the CPL through
legislation.111 However, although the Legislative Yuan amended the CPL
several times, it has been reluctant to codify the scope in the statute or give
guidance in the Enforcement Rules.112
The Bo-Li case also prompted academics to discuss the interplay
between the Medical Care Act and the CPL on the issue of no-fault liability.
The Medical Care Act was enacted in 1986 for the purposes of promoting
medical development and improving national health.113 Since the Bo-Li
case, doctors have advocated for the legislature to clarify the scope of
medical liability under the Medical Care Act. In response to physicians’
lobbying, Article 82 of the Medical Care Act was added in 2004 to limit
medical liability to acts that were “deliberate or [committed] by accident.”114
As the amended Act only stipulates the liability for these specific categories,
the medical profession contended that no-fault liability under the CPL
should not apply. However, this argument’s validity has been questioned.115
Although the Medical Care Act excludes no-fault liability, it does not
exclude the applicability of the CPL to medical care.116 Until the scope of
the CPL is clearly defined in the statute itself, medical care is still within the
reach of services under Article 7.

110
Hao Hsiung v. Cathy General Hosp., 2006 CHINESE(TAIWAN) (94 Docket No. I 6) (Taipei Dist.
Ct., Oct. 23, 2006).
111
The Legislative Yuan is the legislative body in Taiwan.
112
The CPL was last amended on Feb 5, 2005.
113
See Medical Care Act, supra note 12, at art. 1, para. 1.
114
See Medical Care Act, supra note 12, at art. 82. This Comment adopts the official Chinese
reading of Article 82 of the Medical Care Act, which is different from the official English translation. The
official English translation of Article 82 of the Medical Care Act reads as “[t]hose conducting medical
practices shall pay proper attention to medical care procedure. Medical care institutions and their medical
personnel who harm patients in the execution of practice, whether deliberate or by accident, shall be
responsible for compensation.”
115
Shinrou Lin & Hsiu-I Yang, Kao pieh ma chieh chien nan ch'an shih chien? hsin i liao fa ti 82 tiao
ti erh hsiang p'ing his [Farewell to the Bo-Li Case? Discussion of Article 82 of the Medical Act], 112 YUEH
TAN FA HSUEH [TAIWAN JURIST] 24, 24 (Sept. 2004).
116
Id. at 25.
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INSTITUTE NO-FAULT MEDICAL

Notwithstanding the judicial and legislative treatment of no-fault
liability for medical malpractice, there remains the question of whether it is
practical to use the CPL as a medical compensation scheme in Taiwan.
A.

The CPL May Not Account for the Difference between Product
Liability and Service Liability

From a comparative law standpoint, the CPL is a rare instance of
legislation that combines product and service liabilities into one law.117 The
“reasonably expected safety standard” under the current Article 7 is derived
from product liability law,118 where it is used to measure defects in a product
without having to prove the manufacturer’s negligence. However, the scope
of the CPL also encompasses service liability.119 A practical concern is that a
standard used to measure product liability may not apply straightforwardly
to services. Because products are tangible, it is easier to measure product
defects against a reasonableness standard. By contrast, the conduct of a
service provider is intangible. Thus, it is harder to apply this standard and
draw the line between negligence and the reasonably expected safety
standard in service liability.120 In addition, the ambiguity of the technical
defense standard also poses a practical problem for instituting no-fault
medical liability under the CPL.121
Another concern arising from this rare legislation is the scarcity of
legal references and precedents.122 Because most other jurisdictions apply
separate laws to products and services, there is not much guidance on the
interpretation of service liability in a case such as Bo-Li. This presents a
problem when the judiciary deals with difficult cases such as malpractice
disputes.
B.

Taiwan’s Social Circumstances Are Not Favorable to Instituting
Medical No-Fault Liability

Prior to Bo-Li, Congressman Fu-Hsueng Shen proposed a no-fault
compensation plan modeled after the Swedish Patient Compensation
117
118
119
120
121
122

Chen, supra note 42, at 42, 61.
Id. at 50.
See CPL, supra note 19, at art. 7.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
Chen, supra note 42, at 61.
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Scheme, introduced in 1975.123 Unlike the cause-based liability under the
CPL, Shen’s proposal was a first-party patient injury insurance system.124
Sweden’s initial insurance scheme was a voluntary contract between a
consortium of Swedish insurers and the county councils, which are
responsible for the public health. It was superior in compensation and cost,
easy to operate, and acceptable to both physicians and patients. In 1997, it
became mandatory for every health care provider in Sweden to compensate
for injuries from medical procedures on a no-fault basis.125
Sweden is one of the few countries with a successful no-fault medical
liability system. Its success is largely due to Sweden’s public health system,
part of the generous welfare system unique to Northern European
countries.126 In Sweden, the state funds all hospitals; only five percent of
physicians are not employees of the state.127 As a result, financial
responsibility is allocated among the national government, county councils,
and municipalities.128 In addition, medical injuries are compensated by other
social insurance systems such as public insurance, workers’ compensation,
security insurance, and no-fault medical drug insurance.129
Compared to Sweden, Taiwan does not have an especially favorable
welfare system and likewise lacks a long tradition of insurance networks.130
In fact, Shen’s suggestion and a similar proposed “Medical Injury
Management Law” were severely questioned as to practicability.131 Unlike
the patient compensation scheme in Sweden, the NHIP covers illness, injury,
and child delivery, but not medical accidents.132 Moreover, very few
insurance companies offer first-party medical insurance plans to patients, as
the use of these insurance policies is traditionally viewed as bad luck by
Taiwanese people.133 Unlike the Swedish system, no-fault liability under the
CPL is purely based on cause.134 Without the support of superior social
welfare systems to compensate medical injuries, it is even less feasible to
123

YANG, supra note 1, at 162-5.
Id. at 164.
125
Susan Hershberg Adelman & Li Westerlund, The Swedish Patient Compensation System: A Viable
Alternative to the U.S. Tort System?, 89 BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 26 (2004), available at
http://www.facs.org/fellows_info/bulletin/2004/adelman0104.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
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See YANG, supra note 1, at 177-83.
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See Adelman & Westerlund, supra note 125, at 26.
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YANG, supra note 1, at 183.
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See I liao shang hai ch'u li fa ts'ao an [Medical Injury Management Law (proposal)] (2006)
(Taiwan). See also Lai, supra note 88.
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See Ch'uan min chien k'ang pao hsien fa [the National Health Insurance Act], art. 2 (Taiwan).
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require medical care providers to bear financial responsibilities regardless of
fault. Because the required social circumstances are missing, it is currently
impractical to apply cause-based or insurance-based no-fault medical
liability in Taiwan.
C.

No-Fault Liability Would Encourage Defensive Medicine

Defensive medicine is performed to avert the possibility of
malpractice lawsuits.135 It refers to the phenomenon where doctors take
actions that reduce risk of liability rather than the risk of error. In the United
States, defensive medicine is an emerging problem in the medical profession
because of concerns over the threat of lawsuits and large damage awards.136
A research study found that three-fourths of medical specialists agreed that
every patient is viewed as a potential malpractice lawsuit because of
concerns over malpractice liability.137 In addition, 91% of specialists
expressed the opinion that the medical liability system limits doctors’ ability
to provide the highest quality care.138 In an effort to ameliorate the burden
of medical professionals, several tort reform and alternative dispute
resolution initiatives have attempted to cope with medical liability in the
U.S.139
Similar to the U.S., the practice of defensive medicine in Taiwan is
increasingly becoming an issue. Since the institution of NHIP, relatively low
premium and comprehensive benefits have attracted more patients to seek
medical care. In turn, there are more medical malpractice lawsuits filed in
courts. Statistics show that in Taiwan, increased disputes also drive medical
personnel to order unnecessary tests or avoid high-risk procedures
altogether.140 These facts seem to counter the Bo-Li court’s reasoning that
the practice of defensive medicine can be attributed to physicians’
irresponsible attitudes.141 It is foreseeable that without a well-structured
compensation scheme, no-fault liability would boost the culture of defensive
medicine among physicians seeking to avoid being sued. In fact, defensive

135

See Defensive medicine, supra note 96.
See Jonathan Todres, Toward Healing and Restoration for All: Reframing Medical Malpractice,
39 CONN. L. REV. 667, 684 (2006).
137
See Michelle M. Mello, et al., Caring for Patients in a Malpractice Crisis: Physician Satisfaction
and Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF., 42, 48-49 (2004), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org (last
visited Mar. 5, 2007).
138
See id. at 49.
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See Todres, supra note 136, at 693.
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medicine is a major concern raised by the Taiwan courts when they refuse to
apply no-fault medical liability.142
Defensive medicine is the least desirable outcome in modern medicine
due to the rise of litigation. Medical judgment is jeopardized, at least to
some extent, by a desire to avoid risk of liability.143 Because defensive
medicine would inevitably expose patients to unnecessary risks, it is
contrary to the underlying policy of the CPL to benefit patients.
Accordingly, until Taiwan has the social capacity to compensate patients on
a no-fault basis, it is against public policy to institute no-fault medical
liability in Taiwan.
VII. TAIWAN SHOULD WORK ON EXISTING PROBLEMS UNDER THE CURRENT
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SCHEME
Instead of a sudden jump to a no-fault scheme, this Comment
proposes that Taiwan should aim to resolve existing problems under the
traditional negligence-based system.
A.

Taiwan Should Strive to Reform the Malpractice Litigation Process

The foremost issue in Taiwan’s medical malpractice scheme is the
difficulty of proving fault in the current malpractice litigation process. It is
partly due to prejudice in the current MRC medical review in favor of the
defendant. Because plaintiffs cannot introduce expert testimony at trial, they
are disadvantaged in medical malpractice litigation. This Comment
proposes that Taiwan restructure the litigation process to reduce a plaintiff’s
burden of proving negligence. For example, the judiciary should frame
inquiries to the MRC with more specificity, and evaluate the review more
critically.144 Courts should also require hospitals to conceal the identities of
involved parties to prevent potential prejudice.145
Further, Taiwan should liberalize the expert review system. The
judiciary could follow common law jurisdictions and allow both parties to
present expert testimony at trial. Because patients generally do not have the
requisite medical training, allowing expert testimony could alleviate the
potential favoritism of medical review. Courts could also adopt the
exception of common knowledge to allow a plaintiff to prove negligence

142
143
144
145

See, e.g., Sheng-Chan, supra note 100.
See Todres, supra note 136, at 685.
See YANG, supra note 1, at 246.
Id.
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without expert testimony,146 or expand the scope of res ipsa loquitur in cases
involving gross or obvious negligence.147 These approaches do not require
MRC review, and could also serve as a solution to the current backlog
problem with increasing judicial inquiries at the MRC. Finally, Taiwan
should emphasize continuing legal education for lawyers and judges in
medical malpractice, and place an emphasis on multi-disciplinary education
in the study of law and medicine.148 Although this will not replace the need
for experts, this institutional change would certainly promote a better
understanding of experts’ opinions.149
B.

The Medical Field Should Emphasize the Duty of Informed Consent
and Medical Malpractice Insurance

The informed consent doctrine is a relatively new concept in Taiwan’s
legal field.150 It did not receive recognition until the late 1990s. After the
Bo-Li case, this doctrine was invoked by academics in the discussion of
whether Dr. Cheng failed to exercise his duty of informed consent.151 One
study argues that the Bo-Li court’s refusal to allow the defendant’s technical
defense implied that the defendant was in fact negligent.152 However, the
Bo-Li court was unable to find the defendant at fault based on the medical
review supplied by the MRC. Had the doctor informed the patients about
the risks of shoulder dystocia and allowed Ms. Tan to choose her birth
method, this case might not have been litigated.
For a long time, physicians were viewed as paternal figures with
supreme authority in Taiwan.153 Patients were in awe of doctors and
generally accepted a doctor’s decision.154 With the increase of medical
malpractice, patients are realizing the importance of making informed
decisions throughout the treatment process. In response to the change in
health care, the legislature codified the duty of informed consent in the
amended Physicians Act.155 However, doctors do not seem to have kept up
with the evolving patient-doctor relationship and are sometimes reluctant to
146
Common knowledge refers to facts or information that is within the comprehension of a jury of
laymen. This exception has been employed in the U.S. See Pry v. Jones, 487 S.W.2d 606 (Ark. 1972).
147
See YANG, supra note 1, at 245.
148
Id. at 247.
149
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150
See Lin & Yang, supra note 115, at 24.
151
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See id. at 31.
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See Lai, supra note 88.
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See Physicians Act, supra note 54, at art. 12.1.
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address patients’ concerns or questions.156 This Comment proposes that the
medical field should emphasize the duty of informed consent through
schooling and continuing education. Medical personnel should realize that
consent is becoming a fundamental part of the patient-doctor relationship;
decision-making is no longer a unilateral process in medical care.
In addition, Taiwan should promote widespread medical malpractice
insurance. Unlike the prevalence of malpractice insurance in the U.S.,
statistics show that only five percent of physicians currently have medical
liability insurance.157 One reason for the low participation rate is physicians’
fear of patients’ skepticism and reputation damage. Another reason is the
lack of feasible insurance plans. Most insurance plans require complex
procedures such as a judicial order before being able to compensate an
injured patient.158 Because these insurance plans do not meet the
expectations and demands of the insured, medical insurance is unpopular
among medical personnel in Taiwan.159
This Comment proposes that Taiwan encourage doctors to participate
in medical malpractice insurance. The government should take steps to
assure the public that a physician’s skill level has nothing to do with the
need for malpractice insurance. Instead, having malpractice insurace
indicates a doctor’s degree of responsibility and ability to compensate a
patient if an injury does occur. This Comment also proposes that the Taiwan
government recommend that insurance companies institute compensation
schemes that do not require doctors to be involved. Injured patients can
request compensation directly from the insurance company, and speed up the
compensation process. Further, to incentivize medical personnel to
participate in medical liability insurance, the judiciary should grant
expedited hearings to insured physicians so that they can reach a judicial
decision sooner than with the uninsured. With the support of malpractice
insurance, doctors are less likely to practice defensive medicine. Aggrieved
patients are more likely to be compensated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Bo-Li case triggered a debate about no-fault medical liability in
Taiwan. The Bo-Li court extended the scope of the CPL to medical care and
156

See Lin & Yang, supra note 115, at 33.
See Yung-Jen Chiu, I chieh shih shih I liao pao hsien chih tu chih wo chien [My opinion on the
medical insurance], available at http://morpheus.typepad.com/iait/2004/10/post_6.html (last visited Mar.
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held that the CPL should apply in medical malpractice. After seven years,
the Taiwan Supreme Court rejected Bo-Li, predicting that no-fault liability
would encourage defensive medicine. However, the legislature’s stand is
still unclear. The Bo-Li case illustrates the obstacles plaintiffs face when
trying to prove a doctor’s negligence. However, comparison to other
systems reveals that a no-fault medical liability requires a superior social
welfare system and insurance network. Therefore, it is currently impractical
in Taiwan. This Comment proposes that instead of a sudden switch to nofault liability, Taiwan should strive to solve existing problems under the
traditional scheme by improving the litigation process, implementing the
doctrine of informed consent, and encouraging the participation of medical
malpractice insurance.
IX.

TRANSLATION OF BO-LI LI V. MACKAY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
The Taiwan Taipei District Court Civil Judgment 85 Docket No. SU

5125
[Case Holding:]
Regarding the damage compensation between the parties, the court’s
judgment is as follows: the defendant shall pay the plaintiff one million NT
dollars from December 7, 1996 until the balance is paid off. The interest is
calculated at the annual rate of five percent. The defendant shall be
responsible for the litigation cost.
Reasoning:
Third,160 the CPL merely defines “merchandise” in the statutory
language but does not give any definition or restriction for “service.” Any
business or enterprise that provides services to consumers, due to its relation
with consumers’ safety and sanitation, is subject to the CPL regardless of
whether the services are related to merchandise. Furthermore, consumption
is an activity to reach an individual’s life goals. Any activity based on
living, seeking a convenient or comfortable life is within the scope of
consumption; any activity calculated to satisfy an individual’s desire for
edibles or food, clothing, accommodation, transportation, education, or
entertainment is consumption. In short, all activities related to human life
are within the scope of consumption (with reference to Understanding the
Consumer Protection Law, page 55 and Information on Questions and
Answers of the Consumer Protection Law, page 11 by Sen-Lin Chan, ChenYu Feng and Ming-Chu Lin). From the perspective of medical care
160

Translator’s Note: the first and second paragraphs of this section are omitted in the translation.
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providers, medical care is neither related to merchandise nor for the purpose
of profit. However, it is highly relevant to consumers’ safety or sanitation.
From the perspective of medical care receivers, medical care is an activity
based on essential needs and a desire to live. It is evident that patients
receive medical care for reason of consumption (with reference to Article 2,
Paragraph 1 of the CPL161). Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the CPL provides that
“business operators engaging in the provisions of services shall ensure that
services provided by them are without danger to safety or sanitation.” The
CPL shows that the nature of services defined in the statute is based on the
presumption that consumers may be subject to the risks of public health or
safety dangers from the services provided. Medical care is within the scope
of professional and technical services, not related to merchandise or business
transactions. Also, there are medical uncertainties and risks involved in the
diagnosis or treatment process and no assurance that the process will be
“free of danger to safety or sanitation.” Medical care is closely related to
public life, health, and safety. The legislative purpose [of the CPL] is to
protect consumer interests and promote consumer safety, as well as raise the
quality of life (with reference to Article 1 of the CPL). Therefore, medical
care shall be regulated under the CPL. Moreover, there are uncertainties and
risks associated with every profession. It is without merit that the CPL does
not apply to medical services because of the risks involved. By contrast,
health care providers should bear a higher degree of liability for the
particular uncertainties and risks concerned. Further, the CPL does not
impose unlimited no-fault liability to service providers. There is a clear
definition of “danger to safety or sanitation” stated in Article 5 of the
Enforcement Rules, which limits the scope of no-fault liability under the
CPL. Thus, no-fault liability would not apply to unmanageable variables in
the treatment process, which are excluded from the scope of no-fault liability
under the definition of the Enforcement Rules. If a physician refuses to see
high-risk patients, stops trying uncertain surgeries to avoid no-fault liability,
or increases the number of unnecessary check-ups, tests, treatments or
surgeries, and wastes medical resources or increases health care costs, this
would be the physician’s personal attitude to refuse responsibility. As
medical care is tightly associated with patients’ life and health, how could a
doctor advance his personal interests at the expense of patients’ rights? In
conclusion, medical services are within the scope of the CPL.

161
Translator’s Note: see CPL, supra note 19, at art. 2, para. 1 (providing that “the term ‘consumers’
means those who enter into transactions, use goods or accept services for the purpose of consumption”).
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Fourth, Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the CPL expressly provides that the
business operator shall ensure that the service they provide is free of “danger
to safety or sanitation.” The “danger to safety or sanitation” refers to the
services that do not comply with reasonably expected safety standards or
meet professional or technical standards under Article 5 of the Enforcement
Rules. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant provided services with danger
to safety or sanitation, which caused plaintiff’s shoulder dystocia. The
plaintiff requested damages, which were disavowed by the defendant. The
defendant argued that the services provided satisfy the standards of
reasonably expected safety and are in accord with current medical
knowledge, without any health or safety risks. Thus, there is no liability
under the law. Under the no-fault liability rule of the CPL, the burden of
proof shifts to the defendant to prove that the services comply with the
standards of current technology or profession (with reference to Article 6 of
the Enforcement Rules).
But the court finds:
First, Article 7 of the CPL stipulates a no-fault liability scheme with a
clear legislative intent. Article 7, Paragraph 3 of the CPL states that if
business operators can prove that they are not guilty of negligence, the court
may reduce their liability for damages, provided that the assessment does not
affect the establishment of the liability claim. Under Article 5, Paragraph 1
of the Enforcement Rules, the interpretation should not be based on whether
the conduct of the relevant business operator is culpable. Otherwise, the rule
merely converts the existing product liability scheme under the CPL to an
assumed liability system, and would not reach the original legislative intent
to allocate the risks under a no-fault liability system. Accordingly, the
determining factor is not whether a particular manufacturer who complies
with the typical objective group standard could recognize the risks or
defects. Instead, it is whether anyone would know the risks in an objective
standard. Therefore, the burden to prove they were not at fault is waived
only upon a situation where no one could recognize the risks or defects.
Such interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent of no-fault
liability. According to Article 7, Paragraph 3 of the CPL, the court may
reduce liability for damages if business operators can prove no-fault.
Therefore [the law] does not impose an unreasonable burden on the business
operators. The defense of risk liability in development and technology
standards applies to matters related to unknown risks (with reference to
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volume 1, pages 135 to 147 of “General Discussion of Risk Liability in
Development” by Ming-Yang Huang).162
Third, Chang-Lan Tan received her first ultrasound examination on
September 22, 1994. Cheng-Chieh Cheng corrected the estimation of Ms.
Tan’s full-term pregnancy from the originally assessed thirty-two weeks to
twenty-nine weeks, and re-assessed the estimated date for delivery to be
December 10, 1994. Tan received a second ultrasound examination on
November 21, 1994 when she was in her 38th week of pregnancy. Cheng
estimated the fetal weight to be 3,500 grams, which is equivalent to the
weight of a 40-week fetus. Tan originally weighed 80 kilograms and gained
up to 90.8 kilograms on December 1, 1994 at the last prenatal check-up; she
was considered an overweight mother. The plaintiff weighed 4,198 grams at
birth and was considered a macrosomic infant. Maternal overweight, fetal
macrosomia and the use of midpelvic vacuum extraction are three risk
factors for shoulder dystocia. These facts were supported by the report of
Medical Review Committee on December 14, 1995 and the testimony of
Cheng (see the argument record on November 5, 1997). Neither party
disputes the facts, so they are considered valid. Cheng estimated the fetal
weight at week 38 as equivalent to that of a 40-week-old fetus at the second
prenatal check-up. Tan’s overweight was also evident at the last prenatal
visit. Based on the facts stated above, it was objectively foreseeable that
there was a risk of shoulder dystocia. Although there is an allowable error
rate of 15% with ultrasonography, given that the estimated birth weight is
3,500 grams, the range of plaintiff’s estimated birth weight was 3,230 grams
to 4,370 grams. Why did Cheng state that the plaintiff was 3,230 grams
rather than 4,370 grams of weight? The defendant and Cheng repeatedly
stressed that the data provided by the NTU Hospital is the average growth
weight. However, knowing that the data was an average value, objectively
speaking, there is a possibility that the plaintiff weighed more than the
average. Absent any reliable method of prenatal diagnosis of shoulder
dystocia, the defendant should not have neglected the fact that the plaintiff’s
estimated weight was higher than the average at the second prenatal
checkup.
Fourth, in summary, according to prenatal check-up data, objectively
speaking, the incidence of shoulder dystocia in this case is neither a situation
where “no one could have recognized the risks,” nor a situation where the
risk is unknown and no one is able to be aware of it. Therefore, the
defendant is not entitled to use the defense of technology standards in the
162

Translator’s Note: the second paragraph of this section is omitted in the translation.
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present case. Furthermore, the business operator who failed to ensure that
the services provided were free of danger to safety or sanitation and thus
injured the consumers is jointly liable for damages. However, the court may
reduce the liability for damages if the business operator can demonstrate that
he was not at fault. This is set forth in Article 7, Paragraph 3 of the CPL.
The court finds:
First, the defendant failed to correctly predict the shoulder dystocia
and provided services with danger to safety or sanitation, causing permanent
injuries and dysfunctions to the plaintiff’s right forearm. As mentioned
previously, the plaintiff has the legal basis to request damages under the law
stated above. The defendant argued that the cause of the plaintiff’s plexus
injury is unclear in the present case. Shoulder dystocia treated with the
McRoberts maneuver may cause brachial plexus injuries in newborns. In
addition, the incidence of brachial plexus injuries associated with shoulder
dystocia is 15.2%. These facts are stated in the report of the Medical
Review Committee, Department of Health, the Executive Yuan on December
14, 1995, and are attached to page 55 of the criminal case file. The plaintiff
had his first check-up at Chang Gung Memorial Hospital on December 12,
1994 and was diagnosed as having plexus sprain and palsy in the right
forearm. The medical condition is generally caused by fetal overweight
(overweight is commonly defined as over 4,000 grams. The plaintiff was
4,198 grams at birth) or by broad scapula. The plaintiff had both conditions,
which was stated in the report of 84 Docket No. Chang Gung Yuan Fa 0116
(May 5, 1995) from Chang Gung Memorial Hospital attached to page 52 of
the criminal case file. The facts that the plaintiff had shoulder dystocia and
that Cheng used the McRoberts maneuver and performed a midpelvic
vacuum extraction are described above. Accordingly, there is a clear causal
relationship between the shoulder dystocia and the plexus sprain. The court
cannot accept the defendant’s argument that the cause of plaintiff’s injury
was unclear.
Second, the trial court asked Chang Gung Memorial Hospital in the
criminal file: what is the cause of the plaintiff’s injury? The Hospital
replied: “Bo-Li Li had his first visit to our hospital on December 12, 1994.
He was diagnosed as having plexus sprain and palsy in the right forearm.
The medical condition is generally caused by fetal overweight (overweight
is commonly defined as over 4,000 grams. The plaintiff was 4,198 grams at
birth) or by broad shoulders. The plaintiff had both conditions.” [The facts
were] stated in the report of 84 Docket No. Chang Gung Yuan Fa 0116 (May
5, 1995) from Chang Gung Memorial Hospital attached to page 52 of the
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case file. The court then inquired to the NTU Hospital whether it was
possible to discover the condition of fetal overweight or broad shoulders at
the prenatal check-up, how a gynecologist should handle the situation upon
discovering the facts over the course of pregnancy, and how a doctor should
deal with the situation upon discovering the facts at labor.
The NTU Hospital responded:
First, the current evaluation of fetal size depends on the
symphyseal-fundal height and the abdominal circumference.
Ultrasonography is more accurate in predicting fetal weight.
However, there is an associated error rate of 15%. Second, if
there is a possibility of fetal overweight (in general, more than
4,000 grams), [the physician has to] assess the maternal pelvis
size. If the assessment of the maternal pelvis size is not
commensurate with the fetal head size, a Caesarean section is
recommended.
Third, sometimes shoulder dystocia is
unpredictable in obstetrics. Upon discovering the medical
condition stated above, the doctor could apply the McRoberts
or the Woods maneuver to facilitate with childbirth. This
statement is supported by the report 84 Docket No. Hsiao Fu I
Mi 8496 (June 15, 1995) from the NTU Hospital attached to
page 59 of the criminal case file. The report of the Medical
Review Committee, Department of Health, Executive Yuan
provides that: (A) Shoulder dystocia is an emergency situation
where the fetal head has been delivered but the shoulders
cannot be delivered naturally or with a steady labor induction.
Prenatal factors of shoulder dystocia [are described below.
First,] maternal obesity. According to the report by Johnson
and other [medical experts] in 1987, the incidence of shoulder
dystocia in newborns from mothers weighing above 250 pounds
is 5.1%. The incidence in newborns from mothers weighing
below 200 pounds is 0.1%. [The second prenatal factor is] fetal
macrosomia. In 1985, Spellacy etc. reported that the incidence
of shoulder dystocia is 8.2% in newborns weighing between
2,500 and 3,500 grams from mothers weighing above 90
kilograms; 33% in newborns weighing between 4,500 and
5,000 grams; and 50% in newborns weighing above 5,000
grams. [The third prenatal factor is] maternal diabetes. As the
chance of fetal macrosomia increases with maternal diabetes,
the incidence of brachial plexus injury associated with shoulder
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dystocia is 15.2% in case of maternal diabetes. (B) Factors
causing shoulder dystocia at labor [are described below. First,]
prolonged labor. In 1985, Acker etc. reported that among
newborns weighing above 4,000 grams, the incidence of
shoulder dystocia increases if there is a prolonged labor. [The
second factor is] use of oxytocin. Excessive labor induction
and fetal macrosomia would increase the use of oxytocin.
These factors combined would cause shoulder dystocia. [The
third factor is] use of midpelvic forceps and vacuum extraction.
Fetal macrosomia would increase the use of forcep delivery and
vacuum extraction. The rate of injury is high if shoulder
dystocia is not properly dealt with. According to Bendetti and
Gabbe’s report in 1978, out of nineteen shoulder dystocia cases,
there were five incidents of clavicle or forearm fractures, three
incidents of brachial plexus palsy and one incident of abnormal
neurological exam result. Literature also reported incidents of
death caused by serious hypoxia. (C) Shoulder dystocia is
considered to be an unpredictable and totally unpreventable
emergency in current medical practice. The American Society
of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) in 1991 recommended
the approach of episiotomy, adequate anesthesia, and
suprapubic pressure with downward traction on the fetal head.
The approach of the McRoberts maneuver (the position of
raising the legs up and pushing them back against the
abdomen), Woods Corkscrew maneuver (rotation of the anterior
shoulder 180 degrees in a progressive manner), or prioritizing
posterior arm delivery may cause fetal brachial plexus injuries.
The last resort is to push the fetal head back into the vagina and
use Caesarean section, perform clavicle fracture or
symphysiotomy. This method would cause most serious fetal
injuries. Therefore the adoption of Caesarean section after
shoulder dystocia has occurred is not an ideal delivery method.
(D) The plaintiff’s mother weighed 90.8 kilograms and was
considered overweight. The newborn weighed 4,198 grams and
was considered a macrosomic infant. Maternal overweight,
fetal macrosomia, and the use of midpelvic vacuum extraction
are the risk factors of shoulder dystocia.163 In the instant case,
the doctor performed procedures that conform to the current
163

Translator’s Note: the quoted information in this sentence is omitted in the translation.
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medical practice. In terms of preventive measures at prenatal
check-ups, fetal macrosomia is assessed by the symphysealfundal height or by the more accurate ultrasonogaphy.
According to the medical record, Tan’s symphyseal-fundal
height was 34 centimeters, which is within the safety range.
The error rate with ultrasound assessments of fetal weight is
15% or more if the fetal head has been fixed. Thus, the
defendant was not at fault for failing to predict the plaintiff’s
weight. Based on the records of Tan and the prenatal checkups, it was reasonable to choose vaginal birth. (E) The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant’s doctor adopted the inappropriate
birth method, which may be referred to as the first approach in
the third paragraph. This approach is used to deal with shoulder
dystocia and thus is not improper.
A Medical Review Committee’s report, Department of Health Docket No. I
84072466 on January 12, 1996 supports this conclusion. A witness—Dr.
Fang-I Hong—present at the plaintiff’s birth, testified:
[W]hen we discovered the shoulder dystocia, we raised Tan’s
legs and had the assistant apply suprapubic pressure to help
with the plaintiff’s birth. We helped Tan raise her legs and push
them back. We were obligated to perform these procedures.
We have the medical record with notes written by the interns,
residents, the attending physicians, and myself.
According to the rule of negligence, the actor is at fault if he fails to exercise
duty of care under the circumstances, though not intentional; or if he has
foreseen the facts that would constitute crimes, but believed that the facts
would not occur. The evidence provided by Chang Gung Memorial
Hospital, the NTU Hospital, the Medical Review Committee and Dr. Hong’s
testimony does not prove whether Cheng failed to exercise the duty of care
over the course of Tan’s pregnancy, during her labor or upon discovering
shoulder dystocia, or had foreseen the facts that would constitute crimes, but
believed that the facts would not occur. The court found that Cheng was not
at fault. According to the criminal files from the Taiwan Taipei District
Court 84 Docket No. TZU 427 and the Taiwan High Court 85 Docket No.
SHANG-I 2132, Cheng is not found guilty for occupational negligence.164
164
Translator’s Note: see Criminal Code, supra note 3, at arts. 276, 284 (providing that a person who
in the performance of his occupation causes bodily harm to another by neglecting the degree of care
required by such occupation shall be punished with imprisonment).
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Cheng is the agent of the defendant which provided medical services to the
plaintiff. As Cheng was not at fault, under Article 224 of the Civil Code,165
the defendant should likewise be found not at fault. Considering the
business operator’s risk and the plaintiff’s injuries, the court reduces onetenth of the original damage award under Article 7 of the CPL.166
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the plaintiff has demonstrated
reasons in his claims. The judgment is entered as in this opinion according
to Article 78 of the Code of Civil Procedure.167
The Civil Sixth Division Presiding Judge: Hui-Rou Tsai
January 2, 1998

165
Translator’s Note: see Civil Code, supra note 4, at art. 224 (providing that a debtor shall be
responsible for the intentional or negligent acts of his agent and of the person performing the obligation for
him to the same extent as he is responsible for his own intentional or negligent acts, unless otherwise
agreed upon by the parties).
166
Translator’s Note: the third paragraph of this section is omitted in the translation.
167
Translator’s Note: see Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 74, at art. 78 (providing that the costs
of an action shall be borne by the party defeated).

